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THE GOVERNMENT AS A GARNISHEE
R. FOSTER SCOTT*
The garnishment of monies in the custody of govern-
mental units assumes ever increasing importance as govern-
ment dispenses more and more of the national income., In
1938 approximately one person in ten received income from
* Afember, Indiana Bar; School of Education, Indiana University.
ITHE ECONOMIC ALMANAC FOR 1940. National Industral Conference
Board, 247 Park Avenue, New York City, July, 1940, reports: In
the United States there are in excess of 182,000 political units of
government having the power to levy taxes. Of these governing
units, federal, state, and local, during 1938 the federal govern-
ment alone supplied the income in whole or in part to 12,842,227
persons as follows: the regular government establishment of
2,198,814 persons (including 901,453 pensioners); and the emer-
gency measures supplying income to 10,491,644 persons (including
5,248,796 farmers receiving conservation payments). The num-
ber of active employees of all governments for 1938 was 3,788,616,
and this group received an estimated compensation of 5,507 mil-
lion dollars (pp. 359-360.)
Since 1931 federal tax collections per capita have ranged
from $15.24 in 1932 to $47.17 in 1938, and during the same period
the expenditures have ranged from $28.68 in 1931 to $69.29 in
1939. The excess of expenditures over general and special ac-
count receipts has averaged, about $20.00 per capita each year
since 1931 (p. 341).
The increasing portion of the national income which passes
through government is presented for selected years since 1799
as follows (pp. 304, 362)-
Year National income in millions Ratio of government
expense to national
income
1799 677 0.9
1869 6,827 4.2
1899 15,364 6.5
1915 32,533 6.0
1921 56,689 9.3
1930 72,398 9.8
1932 46,708 15.9
1934 51,560 18.1
1936 65,246 19.7
1938 62,450 19.5
(545)
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
government for past or present services or because of con-
tractual agreements. The aggregate total of money passing
through the coffers of the governing units represented 19.5
per cent of the national income, a percentage exceeded only
by manufacturing and industry which accounted for an esti-
mated 19.7 per cent.
The desire of a creditor to reach assets belonging to a
dilatory debtor in the hands of a third person is very old.
The Romans devised a practice to reach such assets; the
custom of London allowed a citizen to pursue the effects and
credits of a non-resident debtor ;2 and the original states of
the Union enacted statutes8 allowing foreign attachment or
garnishment. In 1818 Congress empowered the federal gov-
ernment in suits instituted by it to summons debtors of a
corporation, as garnishees when the corporation was indebted
to the government., Notwithstanding the very long history
of the process of garnishment, it is today regarded as a
statutory process 5 and as such is subject to the rules of
statutory construction. 6
The earlier laws relating to garnishment or foreign at-
tachment made no reference to employees or officers of the
governing agencies. The earliest explicit statute probably
was the Pennsylvania act exempting from garnishment the
wages and salaries of officers and employees of the govern-
ment.7 Thus, in most cases courts must interpret the general
attachment or garnishment statutes and apply them to the
governing units." Almost invariably the application of the
statute and process to the governing agencies has been denied.
2 28 C.J. 1.
3 May 1784, pp. 137-38. Acts and Laws of Connecticut 1796; Ancient
Charters and Laws, Mass. Bay, Ch. 267.
'3 Stat. 443 (1818).
5Freeport Motor Casualty Co. v. Medden, 354 Ill. 486, 188 N. E. 415
(1933); Bean v. Ingraham, 128 Me. 238, 147 Atl. 191 (1929);
Roach v. Henry, 186-Ark. 884, 56 S.W. (2d) 577 (1933); Black
v. Plumb, 94 Col. 318, 29 P. (2d) 708 (1934).
SWorks & Rhea v. Shaw, 180 La. 77, 156 So. 81 (1934); Wallace v.
Lawyer, 54 Ind. 501 (1876); Nat'l Sec. Corp. v. Price, 129 Nebr.
433, 261 N.W. 894 (1935).
7 1845 Session Laws, Chap. 126, §4, p. 188.
s For references to studies of unpaid money judgments, see Reeves v.
Crownshield, 274 N.Y. 74, 8 N. E. (2d) 283 (1937).
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The Federal Government and its creations as garnishees.
In an early case, writs were issued by the court of Norfolk
County, Virginia, at the insistence of six boarding-house
keepers against certain seamen of the frigate Constitution.
The writs were laid on money in the hands of the purser due
to the seamen for wages. The purser admitted the sums
due, but paid the money to the seamen, contending that he
was not amendable to the process, whereupon the court en-
tered judgment against him on the attachment. On appeal,
Mr. Justice McLean reversed the state court on the ground
that a purser cannot be distinguished from any other dis-
bursing agent of the government, and so long as the money
remains in the hands of the disbursing officer it is as if it
had not been drawn from the treasury of the United States.'
Since that date the state decisions have not been in agree-
ment, particularly when the newer federal corporations and
administrations have been garnishees. Some of the state
courts have treated the federal corporations as a foreign cor-
poration doing business in the state and subject to state
garnishment and attachment laws; these courts have interp-
reted the "to sue and be sued" clause to strip the corpora-
tion of governmental immunity. Other states have regarded
federal corporations as carrying on governmental functions
and have given a limited application to the "to sue and be
sued" powers of the corporation and denied the application
for garnishment.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Graves Bros., Inc.,
v. Lasley et allo allowed garnishment of an A. A. A. check for
crop control. The appellants as plaintiffs below had leased
land to the defendant (appellee) for a term, and there was a
lien on the crop for rent due. Through a crop control agree-
ment the lessee had plowed under a portion of the crop and
was entitled to a check from the Department of Agriculture,
which check was in the hands of the local county agent. The
prayer was for judgment against the renter, and for the
check and options to be impounded, assigned, and subjected
to the landlord's lien. The court reaffirmed its holding that
the state and subdivisions could not be garnisheed in the
action at law, but stated that a creditor's bill in equity to
9 Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 20 (U.S. 1846).
0 190 Ark. 251, 78 S.W. (2d) 810 (1935).
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compel assignment of a debt would be allowed where, as here,
all that remained to be done was the payment of the money.
The Louisiana court, faced with a similar situation in
the case of Works & Rhea -v. Shaw," reached a different
conclusion. Plaintiffs holding a judgment against the prin-
cipal defendant had a writ of garnishment issued to the
parish demonstration agent for the state of Louisiana who
was also agent for the Secretary of Agriculture of the United
States. The agent admitted the indebtedness of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture to the defendant and also admitted that
the sum of this indebtedness was represented by a check in
his hands. The amount was due under a cotton "plowing
up" agreement. The court granted the garnishee's and de-
fendant's prayer to dismiss the proceedings, which it did on
the basis of Buchanan v. Alexander,12 notwithstanding the
plaintiff's argument that the government had entered into a
private and commercial field of business and "that merchants
who supply the farmer on faith of the crop must sit by and
see that crop plowed up, which had it matured would have
been subject to seizure without having the same right to
seize the funds paid as consideration for the destruction of
the crop."
During 1936, in the case of Gill v. Reese, Ohio declared
the H.O.L.C. to be a private corporation and subject to
garnishment process within the state notwithstanding the
fact that the corporation had characteristics of a public en-
terprise.1 3 The articles of incorporation provided "said Cor-
poration shall have power to sue and be sued, and shall have
the powers and immunities of corporations of the United
States." The court construed "to sue and be sued" as an un-
equivocal expression to strip the corporation of its rights and
immunities of a sovereign power in relation to suits instituted
against it.
But, at the same time, the Supreme Court of Tennessee,
11 180 La. Rep. 77, 156 So. 81 (1934).
124 How. 20 (U.S. 1846); footnote 9 supra.
43 53 Ohio App. 134, 4 N. E. (2d) 273 (1936). Accord: Haines v.
Lone Star Shipbuilding Corp., 268 Pa. 92, 110 Atl. 788 (1920),
id. 275 Pa. 260, 118 Atl. 909 (1922); Central Market, Inc. v.
King et al., 132 Neb. 380, 272 N.W. 244 (1937); H. & P. Paint
Supply Co. v. Ortloff, 159 Misc. 886, 289 N.Y.S. 367 (1936); Mc-
Avoy v. Weber (H.O.L.C.), 198 Wash. 370, 88 P. (2d) 448 (1939);
Burr v. Heffner, 289 Mich. 91, 286 N. W. 169 (1939). See (1936)
15 Chicago-Kent L.R. 237; (1937) 17 Boston U.L.R. 191; (1938)
2 Minn. L.R. 293.
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in H. 0. L. C. v. Hardie & Caudle'- was deciding a similar
case to the contrary. This court interpreted the H.O.L.C.
Act as disclosing neither an express nor an implied intention
to subject the- corporation to the garnishee process. "By the
great weight of authority," said the court, "general provisions
of statutes, authorizing garnishment of persons, do not apply
to the federal and state governments or their officers or
agencies such as counties, cities, and boards and commissions
intrusted with administration of governmental affairs. A
distinction has been taken wherein the state has divested it-
self of its character of sovereign and descended to the com-
mon level of a commercial and economic adventurer. The
H. 0. L. C. is a governmental agency and has not divested
itself of its character of sovereign and descended to the
common level of a commercial and economic adventurer."
The federal Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case
of McCarthy v. U. S. Shipping Board,15 in 1932, thus ap-
parently indirectly sanctioning the limited interpretation and
application of the conventional "to sue and be sued" clause.
This situation was clarified somewhat in 1935 when the court
held that the "to sue and to be sued" power included the ac-
tion of attachment on a judgment against the corporation,
because "the liability to suit included by implication the proc-
ess of attachment."'6 Again in 1939, the court, after com-
menting on the number of governmental corporations created
by Congress with power to sue and be sued,17 said by way of
dicta that the inclusion of the clause was "an indication of the
present climate of opinion which has brought governmental
immunity from suit into disfavor" and "a definite attitude
on the part of Congress which should be given hospitable
scope."',
14 171 Tenn. 43, 100 S.W. (2d) 238 (1936). See Walker v. Turner,
22 Tenn. App. 280, 122 S.W. (2d) 804 (1938); (1937) 32 Ill. L.
Rev. 483.
15McCarthy v. U.S. Shipping Board, 60 App. D.C. 311, 53 F. (2d)
923 (1932); cert denied, 285 U.S. 547 (1932); Shipping Board held
as garnishee in Haines v. Lone Star Shipbuilding Corporation,
268 Pa. 92, 110 Atl. 788 (1920), id. 275 Pa. 260, 118 Atl." 909
(1922).
2OFederal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229 (1935).
'7Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations (1935) 21 Va. L.R.
351, 465.
IsKeifer & Keifer v. R.F.C., 306 U.S. 381 (1939). The exemption of
the United States and the several states from being subjected as
defendants to ordinary actions in the courts has, since the time
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Then in Federal Housing Administration v. Burr,19 Mr.
Justice Douglas asserted that: "Clearly the words 'sue and be
sued' in their normal connotation embrace all civil process
incident to the commencement or continuance of legal pro-
ceedings. Garnishment and attachment commonly are part
and parcel of the process, provided by statute, for the collec-
tion of debts.... To say that Congress did not intend to in-
clude such civil process in the words 'sue and be sued' would
in general deprive suits of some of their efficacy. Hence, in
the absence of special circumstances, we assume that when
Congress authorized federal instrumentalities of the type
here involved to 'sue and be sued' it used those words in
their usual and ordinary sense. State decisions barring gar-
nishment against a public body though it may sue and be
sued are not persuasive here as they reflect purely local
policies . . . and involve considerations not germane to the
problem of amenability to suit of the modern federal corpora-
tion.... Whether by Michigan law execution under such a
judgment may be had is, like the availability of garnishment,
a state question. And so far as the federal statute is con-
cerned, execution is not barred .... That of course does not
mean that any funds or property of the United States can
be held responsible for this judgment. Claims against a
corporation are normally collectible from corporate assets.
That is true here."
By construing the congressional grant to proprietary
corporations to include "all civil process", the court has fur-
ther enlarged the scope of the statutory grant of power "to
sue and to be sued." If Congress in the creation of a federal
corporation includes the conventional "to sue and be sued"
of Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (U.S. 1821) been repeatedly
asserted, the principle has never been discussed or the reasons
for it given, but it has always been treated as an established
policy. The doctrine of non-suability may be based on the theory
that the United States is the institutional descendant of the
Crown, enjoying its immunities but not its historical privileges,
Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341 (1879); as part of the
common law heritage, Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19
Wall. 239 (U.S. 1873); or on the metaphysical doctrine that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
upon which the right depends, Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205
U.S. 349 (1906), or by implication, Principality of Monaca v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
19 309 U.S. 242 (1940), affirming Burr v. Heffner, 289 Mich. 91, 286
N.W. 169 (1939). See also Sherwood v. U.S., 112 F. (2d) 587
(C.C.A. 2d, 1940), cert. granted 61 S. Ct. 171 (1940).
THE GOVERNMENT AS A GARNISHEE
clause, the corporate assets are subject to the garnishment,
attachment, and execution laws of the jurisdiction in which
the corporation is doing business. Arkansas, Michigan, Ne-
braska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington have
held federal corporations amenable to the garnishee process.
The District of Columbia, Louisiana, and Tennessee have held
federal corporations immune to garnishment.
Congressional appropriations for specific purposes fre-
quently provide immunity from assignment, attachment, or
garnishment. As early as 1792 a statute was enacted declar-
ing the assignments of pensions void.2 0 Other statutes have
placed the same protection on land grants,2 1 adjusted com-
pensation certificates,22 and civil service employees retire-
ment pay.2 3 The same protection has been accorded funds
made available for relief clients or for projects which are
designed primarily to reduce unemployment.2' Today the
Secretaries of War,25 Navy, Commerce, Labor, Interior, and
Agriculture have statutory authority2 6 to issue regulations
setting out the conditions under which and the procedure
whereby employees of their respective departments may as-
sign their pay. To this extent the federal government has re-
stricted the protection maintained by the courts.
The states and their creations as garnishees.-Although
the present day tendency is toward explicit legislative enact-
ment and the garnishment of governmental units, early judi-
cial action was without legislative guidance. During the
nineteenth century, whenever the general attachment or gar-
nishment law did not expressly include or exclude govern-
mental employees, the courts by an overwhelming majority
denied the process. Different reasons and combinations of
reasons were given. First, the sovereign cannot be sued with-
out its consent.27  Second, the garnishee process is satutory
201 Stat. 245 (1792); 40 Stat. 442 (1917-1919); 38 U.S.C.A. § 129
(1934).
21 17 Stat. 606, §5 (1873).
2238 U.S.C.A. §643 (1934).
23 5 U.S.C.A. §729 (1934).
2413 C.F.R. 163--Exec. Order No. 7046.
25Army Regulations No. 35-1360.
26 5 U.S.C.A. §§529, 595 (1934); 10 U.S.C.A. §891 (1934); 48 U.S.C.A.
§171 (1934).
27U.S. Const. Am. XI; Dollar Savings Bank v U.S., 19 Wall. 239
(U.S. 1873); Leach v. Am. Surety Co., 210 Mo. App. 203, 242
S.W. 983 (1922); State v. Cook, 171 Tenn. (7 Beeler) 605, 106
S.W. (2d) 858 (1937).
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and, as such, the statute must be strictly construed. 2 Third,
property or money in the hands of the government is in
custodia legis2 9 and cannot be diverted from its legal purpose.
And fourth, public policy,-a category consisting of mis-
cellaneous reasons believed to promote the general welfare.
A closer scrutiny of the public policy and general welfare con-
sideration shows that (a) municipal corporations are organ-
ized for a specific purpose and as such cannot be garnisheed ;30
(b) the public welfare is superior to individual convenience ;31
(c) the public service would suffer if the officials were forced
to leave their duties and appear in court;32 (d) the garnishee
process is susceptible of mischevious use;33 and (e) "if the
remuneration should be reduced the officer would be deprived
of the support and there would arise a hazard of his being
driven to an inappropriate meanness of living, of his being
harassed by the worry of straightened circumstances, and
tempted to engage in unofficial labor, and the likelihood of
his falling off in that official interest and vigilance which
the expectation of pay keeps alive." 34
A survey of current statutes and court decisions indicates
two definite trends: first, state legislatures are stating their
garnishment policy in specific terms; and second, the number
of states favoring garnishment of money due public workers
are increasing. 5
28 Roach v. Henry, 186 Ark. 884, 56 S.W. (2d) 577 (1933); Black v.
Plumb, 94 Colo. 318, 29 Pac. (2d) 708 (1934); Works & Rhea v.
Shaw, 180 La. Rep. 77, 156 So. 81 (1934); Wallace v. Lawyer,
54 Ind. 501 (1876); Nat'l Surety Corp. v. Price, 129 Neb. 433,
261 (N.W. 894 (1935); Walker v. Cook, 129 Mass. 577 (1880).
29First Nat'l Bank v. Mays, 175 Ark. 542, 299 S.W. 1002 (1928);
Millison v. Fisk, 43 Ill. 112 (1867).
30 Hawthorne v. St. Louis, 11 Mo. 60 (1847); Dow v. Irwin, 21 N.M.
576, 157 Pac. 490 (1928).
81 Boyd et al v. Mahone, 142 Va. 690, 128 S.W. 259 (1925).
32 Ward v. County of Hartford, 12 Conn. 404 (1838).
83 McMeeken v. The State, 9 Ark. 553 (1847).
'4 Crown Oil Co. v. Eitner, 16 N.J. Misc. 330, 199 Atl. 901 (1938);
see State v. Hawkins, 44 Ohio 98, 5 N.W. 228 (1886); but "one
would think it was in accordance with public policy to see that
public officers did pay their debts", Cooper v. Schooley, 26 Ohio
App. 313, 159 N.E. 727 (1927).
3 If the state permitted garnishment of any one or more of the com-
monly accepted governing units such as the state, county or
municipality, the state was counted as one permitting the process.
In this class are included states ranging from those permitting
garnishment of the earned income of employees of local govern-
ments o'ly to states legalizing a continuing levy on officials and
employef t of the state and all its subdivisions. If, however, au-
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Of the 48 states, 31 have statutes which permit garnish-
ment in varying degrees against government officials and
employees, and the remaining 17 deny the process either by
specific enactments or by judicial interpretation of the
general garnishment and attachment laws. Two states, Illi-
nois and Indiana, had enacted statutes which would have in-
cluded municipal corporations or local governments, but in
each instance the law was declared unconstitutional. The
Illinois law subjecting salaries of employees of certain local
governments to garnishment was declared unconstitutional as
special legislation because it did not include all units of the
same class created under the general laws of the state.3 6 In
Indiana the clause permitting garnishment of municipal cor-
porations fell when the garnishee law of 1925 was declared
void because of unconstitutional exemptions.3 7 An attempt
was made by the legislature of Tennessee to include state
workers, but the law, in so far as state workers were con-
cerned, was declared invalid because the statutory procedure
did not follow the constitutional provisions for suit against
the state.38
In some states where the interpretation of the statute
excludes governing bodies from the garnishee process, means
have been found to circumvent the immunity. Arkansas has
contributed "equitable garnishment," 39  and Missouri has
adopted it to limit the application of the statute forbidding
garnishment of a public corporation.4 0  Assignment is an
alternative offered by the Minnesota and Wisconsin statutes,
and mandamus has been used to force the employee judg-
ment debtor to honor his financial obligations.41
thority was found which denied the process of garnishment to
public workers, other than relief expenditures, the state was re-
corded as denying the process.
For a complete tabular analysis, see Appendix, infra p. 412.
36 Badenoch v. Chicago, 222 Ill. 71, 78 N.E. 31 (1906).
371925 Acts, Ch. 61, p. 204; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933). §2-4501;
Martin v. Loula, 208 Ind. 346, 195 N.E. 881 (1935); 10 Ind. L. J.
522.
38 State v. Cook, 171 Tenn. (7 Beeler) 605, 106 S.W. (2d) 868 (1937).
't, (1933) 39 W. Va. L. Q. 224-242.
do DeField v. Harding Dredge Co., 180 Mo. App. 563, 167 S. W. 593
(1914), but see Nancy v. LePage,341 Mo. 1039, 111 S. W. (2d)
25 (1937).
41 Pherson v. Young, 69 Kan. 655, 77 Pac. 693 (1904); Bool Floral
Co. v. Coyne, 158 Misc. 13, 284 N.Y.S. 960 (1936); Reeves v.
Crownshield, 274 N.Y. 74, 8 N.E. (2d) 283 (1937); AMASS. GEN.
LAWS (1932) c. 224 §16; N.Y. PRACTICE CODE 793; N. J. REV. STAT.
(1937) 2:26-181.
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The statutory authority permitting garnishment of gov-
ernment workers reveals divergent methods of incorporating
the public worker into the garnishment and attachment
process. By one method attachment and garnishment ap-
plies to all employees and officers of the state or local gov-
ernments with the same force, effect, exemptions, and limita-
tions as are now applicable to other individuals.42 Another
method, in addition to incorporating governmental employees
into the existing garnishment and attachment statutes, makes
added special provisions to fit the garnishment procedure
into the fiscal practices of the state and its public corpora-
tions. 43
The third method, of which California, Washington, and
Wisconsin are the outstanding representatives, provides a
separate and distinct procedure specifically applicable to em-
ployees and officers of the government. In California, when
a judgment for payment of money is rendered by any court
of the state against a defendant to whom money is owed by
the state or subdivision thereof, the judgment creditor may
file-upon the payment of a fee-an authenticated abstract
or transcript of such judgment together with an affidavit
stating the exact amount due and unpaid, with the proper
state or local officer who in turn delivers to the court the
money due the judgment debtor.44 The state or local official
deducts any amounts due the government and is not liable
for failure to perform the duties imposed by the act if rea..
sonable diligence is exercised. The court then pays the bal-
ance---less amounts exempt from execution-to the judg-
ment creditor and the remainder to the judgment debtor.
The Washington statute provides that no regular judgment
shall be entered against a municipal corporation, but the
judge of the superior or justice court shall by written order
direct the paying officer to pay the judgment creditor any
sums, less legal exemptions, due the judgment debtor.45 Under
the Wisconsin law the judgment creditor files a certified
42 Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Nebraska, Tennes-
see, Virginia, West Virginia. In subsequent footnotes where ref-
erences are made to states for citation of the statute see Table I
of the Appendix.
42 Alabama, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wis-
consin.
4" Cal. PROCEDURE & PROBATE CODE (Deering, 1937) §710.
45 WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) §§ 680-2.
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copy of the judgment with the proper -government official
whose duty it is to pay the creditor such sums as are avail-
able until the judgment is satisfied.46
Interpretation and administration of state statutes.-
To comply with constitutional mandates, some states4 7 must
exclude officials whose compensation is protected by the state
constitution. However, in Arizona, Nebraska, and Washing-
ton, the courts have ruled that the garnishment of salaries
of governmental workers does not violate the constitutional
provision which provides that the salaries shall not be in-
creased or decreased after election or during the term of
office .4
In the majority of the states permitting governmental
units to act as garnishees, the law applies to all state and
local officials and employees. However, in Kentucky, Vir-
ginia, and Delaware the law applies to employees only,49 but
the Delaware statute defines an employee to include every
person performing any labor and work for the government,
and seemingly such a provision can be construed to include
officers.5 9 The Minnesota law applies to local governments
and to the State Highway Commissioner.1 In Tennessee,
Vermont, and West Virginia the law specifically limits gar-
nishment to the officers and employees of the subdivisions of
the state generally referred to as local governments. 52 The
Texas home rule statute make it possible for cities, towns,
and villages to provide, if they so desire, that no funds shall
be subject to garnishment.5 3
In the administration of the state's functions there are
numerous political subdivisions and the extent to which they
share immunity from the garnishee process depends upon
the state statutes and the interpretation given by the courts.
It has been held that the term municipal corporation in
4 6 WISC. STAT. (1939) §§ 304-21.
47 California, Colorado, Virginia.
48 State v. Surety Finance Co., 42 Ariz. 42, 21 P. (2d) 929 (1933);
Dept. of Banking v. Foe, 136 Neb. 422, 286 N. W. 264 (1939);
Hanson v. Hodge, 92 Wash. 425, 159 Pac. 388 (1916).
49 KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1936) §1701b; VA. CODE (Michie, 1936) §§6559,
6561.
O Delaware Laws 1939, c. 152, p. 315.
"M INN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§9360-1, 9364.
52 TENN. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1938) §7714; VERMONT LAWS 1933, c. 76,
§ 1762; W. V. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937) § 3910 (1).
GSTEXAS STAT. (Vernon, 1936) Art. 1175 (5).
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garnishment statutes does not include an irrigation district,51
a public corporation," or a county,56 as a county is a sub-
division of the state and not a body politic, corporation, or
quasi-corporation.5 ' If the local government partakes of the
sovereign, 8 or is performing service of a character important
to public welfare, 9 garnishment will not lie against it unless
the statute so provides, but if the governing unit is such that
garnishment does not invoke the protection of public policy,60
or the status of the fund has become such that protection
is not needed,61 or the state is carrying on business inde-
pendent of its sovereignty, garnishment will be sustained. 2
However, the Liquor Control Commission of Michigan has
been held to be a state agency and not subject to an action
in garnishment except as provided by the statute allowing
garnishment against the state.6 3
The state courts have been confronted with the applica-
tion of their garnishment laws to workers of the federal
government and have held that the state laws do not apply.6"
New York, however, while admitting the inapplicability of the
state garnishment law to federal workers, has held that money
once paid to a citizen of New York, is subject to New York
law, and failure to obey the order makes the employee liable
to citation for contempt.6 5
54 Doty v. Saddler, 151 Wash. 542, 276 Pac. 891 (1929).
55 McAvoy v. Weber, 198 Wash. 370, 88 P. (2d) 448 (1939).
513Hoyt v. Paysee, 51 Nev. 114, 269 Pac. 607 (1928); So. Ohio Finance
Co. v. Wahl, 34 Ohio App. 518, 171 N.E. 369 (1930).
57 Bazzoli v. Larsen, 40 Ohio App. 321, 178 N.E. 331 (1931). But see
Fitzgibbon v. DeChant, 58 Ohio App. 453, 16 N.E. (2d) 794 (1938).
's Prudential Mtge. & Inv. Co. v. New Britain, 123 Conn. 390, 195
Atl. 609 (1937).
59 Citizens Discount & Inv. Co. v. Canatella, 6 La. App. 147 (1927).
60 City of Laredo v. Nalle, 65 Tex. 359 (1886); Bray v. Wallingford,
20 Conn. 416 (1850); Davis v. Rain, 26 Ala. App. 380, 161 So.
107 (1935); Seymour v. Over River Sch. Dist., 53 Conn. 502, 3
Atl. 552 (1885). Contra: Weiser v. Payne, 110 Cal. App. 378,
294 Pac. 407 (1930), statute amended 1933 Acts, Ch. 328, p. 906;
1937 Acts, Ch. 211, p. 506.
61 Orchard & Wilhelm Co. v. North, 135 Nebr. 39, 280 N.W. 272 (1938).
62 U.S. v. Pacific Forwarding Co., 8 F. Supp. 647 (W.D. Wash. 1934).
t's Berger v. Schenley Corp. 277 Mich. 159, 269 N.W. 128 (1936).
64 Crown Oil Co. v. Eitner, 16 N.J. Misc. 330, 199 Atl. 901 (1938);
White v. Wright, 151 Okla. 93, 1 P. (2d) 668 (1931).
6rBool Floral Co. v. Coyne, 158 Misc. 13, 284 N.Y.S& 960 (1936);
Reeves v. Crownshield, 274 N.Y. 74, 8 N.E. (2d) 283 (1937).
See also MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 224, § 16; N.3. REV. STAT.
(1937) 2:26-181.
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Where garnishment is allowed, the most common prac-
tice is to permit it only against money due for services al-
ready performed. The terminology of the statutes varies
widely. The usial phraseology includes "any fund whether
derived from appropriations, fees, licenses, special taxes, or
otherwise"66; "money due ...except commissions, percent-
ages or allowances" 67; "any credits or other personal property
belonging to a defendant" 68 ; "money, credits or other prop-
erty belonging to or due and owing" 69; "salary and wages" 70 ;
"earnings already earned by personal services"71 ; or "prop-
erty (real or personal) belonging to creditor's debtor".7 2
The statutes limiting the garnishment order to money
now due or already earned usually require the judgment
creditor to secure several orders before he can satisfy the
debt. The better practice is to have the garnishment order
serve as a continuing levy until the full judgment is paid.13
Except in California, Washington, and Wisconsin, serv-
ice of the summons or writ of garnishment or attachment is
made on the officer of the governing body responsible for
auditing or paying the debtor-employee. The officer is re-
quired to answer; the answer can be made personally or by
mail or deposition, 74 and the answer in some instances is final
and conclusive.75 If the officer refuses to answer he is
subject to mandate.76 If the officer fails in performing his
duty, he or his bondsmen are personally liable77 for the fail-
ure or negligence, but no judgment in default can be entered
against the governing body.78
SO Colorado.67Alabama.
es Idaho, Utah.
0 Montana.
70 Alabama, Nebraska, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New
York, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia; Walker v. Turner, 22
Tenn. App. 280, 122 S.W. (2d) 804 (1938).
- Nebraska.
72North Dakota.
7 This is the practice in New York, New Jersey, Wisconsin. But see
Fox v. Miller, 173 Tenn. (9 Beeler) 453, 121 S.W. (2d) 527 (1938).
7¢ Colorado, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Virginia.
7 Utah, South Dakota.
706Aabama, Colorado.
"7Arizona, Oklahoma. Contra: South Dakota; reasonable diligence re-
quired, California.
78 Mississippi; Commissioner v. City Nat'l Bank, 183 Okla. 137, 80 P.
(2d) 627 (1938).
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After judgment or the filing of the abstract or trans-
cript, 9 the money is paid into court for distribution" or the
disbursing officer may pay to the judgment creditor."' The
principal defendant cannot bring an action against the gar-
nishee pending the final determination of the garnishment
proceedings, and if the garnishment order is issued, the gar-
nishee by paying the plaintiff liquidates the obligation to the
principal defendant to the extent of the order. The judg-
ment debtor may make an assignment of his earnings, 2 but
in case of assignment to one creditor and garnishment by an-
other creditor the garnishment order is superior to the as-
signment.8 3
II
A sufficient number of states now authorize garnishment
of the income of public workers and some have been doing so
for sufficient time to enable an objective determination of its
actual interference with the transaction of public business.8 4
The procedures of California, Washington, and Wisconsin, in
which special methods have been adopted to apply to public
workers, appear to be superior to those of other states. Not
until after judgment is the governmental unit involved. Then
the officer pays into the court or to the judgment creditor
7 California, Washington, Wisconsin.
80 Alabama, California, Colorado, Nebraskaj New Hampshire.
sl Washington, Wisconsin.
82 Minnesota.
83 Wisconsin.
84 There are topics associated with a study of garnishment which are
beyond the scope of this study; for a discussion of the situs of
the debt see, Stone v. Drake, 79 Ark. 384, 96 S.W. 197 (1906);
St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Vanderberg, 91 Ark. 252, 120 S.W. 993(1909): Arlington Trust Co. v. LeVine, 291 Mass. 467, 197 N.E.
195 (1935); the nature of garnishment being in rem or in per-
sonam see, Zuhlke v. Prudential Ins.-Co. 244 App. Div. 549, 279
N.Y.S. 833 (1935); the union of law and equity procedure see,
Brown v. First Nat'l. Bank, 271 Ill. App. 424 (1934); Cook,
Powers of Courts of Equity (1915) 15 Col. L. Rev. 37, 106, 228;
the abuse of process see, Bowen v. Morris, 219 Ala. 689, 123 So.
222 (1929); Rock v. Abrashin, 154 Wash. 51, 280 Pac. 740 (1929);
interpretation of the statutory term persons or corporations see,
Wallace v. Lawyer, 54 Ind. 501 (1876); Atty. Gen. v. Hawkins,
44 Ohio 98, 5 N.E. 228 (1886); Chicago v. Hasley, 25 Ill. 485
(1861); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934); and actions
against the sovereign see, Dollar Say. Bank v. U.S., 19 Wall. 239
(U.S. 1879); Leach v. Am. Surety Co., 21 ' Mo. App. 203, 242
S.W. 983 (1922); State v. Cook, 171 Tenn. (7 Beeler) 105, 106
S.W. (2d) 858 (1937); Keifer & Keifer v. R.F.C., 306 U.S. 381
(1939).
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any sums not specifically exempted, and upon a single order
may continue to pay as funds become due to the debtor em-
ployee until the claim is liquidated. The plan of statutory
assignment of governmental workers' salaries seems to work
satisfactorily as employed in the case of certain federal em-
ployees of the departments of War, Navy, Commerce, Labor,
Interior, and Agriculture. 5
A majority of the states have removed governmental
immunity by amending their existing garnishment laws.
Though in many respects not as satisfactory as the California
procedure, this method is attractive because amendment is
always easier than the enactment of new legislation. If the
amendatory process is followed, however, exact distinctions
should be made between private and public garnishment. Both
immunity and garnishment statutes are always strictly con-
strued. There is need not only for exactness but also for
sufficient flexibility to include new governmental units as
they are created. In some states, constitutional problems in-
volving suits against the state, the change in official salaries
during the term, class legislation and due process need con-
sideration. The state must provide for concise, consummate,
and constitutional procedure.
With the great increase in federal money payments today,
perhaps the most urgent need is a public garnishment pro-
cedure uniform throughout the states. It may be hoped that
the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State
Laws will present a Public Garnishment Law comparable to
their great contributions to the law of sales and negotiable
instruments.
P5 Footnotes 25 and 26, supra. But see Fox v. Miller, 173 Tenn. (9
Beeler) 453, 121 S.W. (2d) 527 (1938); Schwenck v. Wyckoff, 46
N. J. Eq. 560, 20 Atl. 259 (1890).
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APPENDIX
GARNISHMENT OF THE STATE OR ITS SUBDIVISIONS
State Garnishment in whole or in part Garnishment denied
Alabama 1928 Code. Sec. 8060, 8088 to 8093
Arizona 1929 Laws. Ch. 50, p. 156
Arkansas First Nat'l. Bank v. Mays I
Ark 542, 299 S.W. 1002 (192'
California 1929 Code and Gen. Laws. Sec.
710, p. 2246; 1937 Deering Proc.
Code. 710
Colorado 1927 Laws. Ch. 112, p. 374
Connecticut Prudential Mtge. & Inv. Co.
New Britain 123 Conn. 390, 1
AtI. 609 (1937).
Delaware 1939 Laws. Ch. 152, p. 315
Florida Duval Co. v. Charleston Luml
Co. 45 Fla. 256, 33 So. E(1903); Tyler v. Ackerman
Fla. 485, 96 So. 838 (1923).
Georgia 1933 Ga. Code 46-206.
Idaho 1932 Code. 6-507, 6-521.
Illinois Merwin v. Chicago 45 III. 1(1867); Badenoch v. Chicago
Ill. 71, 78 N.E. 31 (1906).
Indiana Wallace v. Lawyer 54 Ind.(1876); Martin v. Loula 208 T1
346, 195 N.E. 881 (1935).
Iowa 1939 Code. Ch. 513, Sec. 121
Kansas 1935 Corrick Gen. Stat. 60-962
Kentucky 1936 Carroll's Ky. Stat. 1701b
Louisiana 1927 Practice Code 647; 1932 1
Civ. Code. Art 1922; 1932 Sessi
Laws, Act 183, p. 575.
Maine 1930 Rev. St., Ch. 100, Sec. E
Clark v. Clark 62 Me. 255 (187,
Maryland Baltimore v. Root 8 Md.
(1855); Hughes v. Svboda I
Md. 440, 178 Atl. 108 (1935).
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Massachusetts 1932 Gen. Laws (Ter. Ed.) Mass.Ch. 224, See. 16; 1933 Ann. Laws.
Vol. 8, Ch. 246, Sec. 32.
Michigan 1929 Qomp. Laws, Ch. 266, Sec.
14902.
Minnesota 1927 Mason's Minn. Stat. Ch. 77,
Secs. 9360-1, 9364.
Mississippi 1930 Ann. Code, Sec. 1838; 1936
Laws. Ch. 321, p. 601.
Missouri 1929 Rev. Stat. 1398; DeField v.
Dredge Co. 180 Mo. App. 563, 167
S.W. 593 (1914).
Montana 1935 Mont. Rev. Code. Ch. 44,
Sec. 9294.
Nebraska 1929 Comp. Stat. Ch. 20, Sec.
1012; 1937 Comp. St. 8-1130.
Nevada, 1929 Hillyer's Comp. St. 8710.
N. Hampshire 1926 Pub. Laws, Ch. 356, Sec. 20;
1939 N.H. Laws, Ch. 202, p. 281.
New Jersey 1937 Rev. Stat. Title 2, Ch. 26,
Secs. 181 and 185.
New Mexico 1929 Statutes Ann. Sec. 59-127.
New York 1930 Cahill's Cons. Laws, Ch. 57,
Sec. 2a; Civil Practice Act, Sec.
793.
No. Carolina Swepson v. Turner 76 N.C. 115,
56 ALR 604 (1876), but see 1939
Michie's Code, Sees. 819, 1410.
No. Dakota 1929 Laws, Ch. 188, p. 258.
Ohio 1938 Page's Ohio Code, Secs.
10273, 11725-1, 11728-1, 11760,
and 11829.
Oklahoma 1925 Laws, Ch. 33, Sec. 1, p. 51;
1939 Laws, Ch. 3, Sec. 1, p. 1.
Oregon 1909 Gen. Laws, Ch. 11, p. 51;
1930 Code Ann. 3-606; Graf. v.
Wilson 62 Or. 476, 125 Pac. 1005(1912).
Pennsylvania 1845 Session Laws, Ch. 126, See.
4, p. 188.
Rhode Island Tucker v. Pollock 21 R. I. 317,
43 Atl. 369 (1899); 1938 Gen.
Laws R.I., Ch. 557, but see Wilson
v. Lewis 10 R.I. 285 (1872).
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So. Carolina
So. Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
W. Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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1932 S. Car. Code, Sec. 3024.
1939 S. Dak. Code 37-2801.
1938 Michie's Tenn. Code, Sec.
7714.
1936 Vernon's Texas St. A3
1175 (5)
1933 Rev. St., Ch. 19, See. 104-19-
25
1933 Public Laws, Ch. 76, Sec.
1762
1936 Va. Code, Ch. 274, Secs.
6559, 6561
1931 Rein. Rev. St., Title 5, Ch. 2,
Sec. 680-1; 1933 Laws Ch. 15, p.
136
1937 W. Va. Code, Sec. 3910(1)
1939 Wisc. St., Sec. 304-21
1931 Wyo. Rev. St. 89-3311
